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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
stock; and a question of the validity of a corporate by-law requiring a quorum
of two-thirds of the stockholders at a meeting for the election of directors
(admittedly this number was not present). The Court reaffirmed its position that
section 25 provides only a summary remedy and thus that the corporate stock-
books must generally be conclusive as to stock ownership, the real question being
reserved for adjudication in a plenary action 8 As to the by-law question, the
Court again affirmed a former holding 9 that such quorum requirements are invalid
in that they contravene public policy of the state as reflected in its statutes. 10
Undoubtedly, the failure of the Court to lay down more specific criteria for
the interpretation of section 25 can be attributed to the peculiar circumstances of
the case. Section 25 allows the Court only two alternatives, to confirm the
election or to order a new one," and since the victorious directors controlled a
majority of the stock, a new election would have been useless. However, the
necessity still exists to clearly elucidate the bounds of the trial court's discretion
in abrogating a questionable election.
Power Of Corporafe Officers To lnsfifufe Lifigaflon
A recurring problem in the field of corporate law is the authority of
corporate officers to institute legal proceedings in behalf of the corporation. It is
undoubted that the board of directors is originally vested with such power,12 but
a question often arises when charter and by-laws are silent and no proscription
has emanated from the board of directors as to the power of corporate officers
to commence litigation. Because of the duties incumbent upon a corporate
president with respect to the management of the corporation,'3 it has been held
that he has prima facie authority to prosecute suits in the name of the corpora-
tion.' 4 But the difficulty appears when lesser corporate officers undertake such
responsibility.
In Rothman & Schneider, Inc. v. Beckerman,15 the Court of Appeals unani-
8. In re Burder & Son, Inc., 302 N.Y. 52, 96 N.E.2d 829 (1950) (dictum).
9. Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945).
10. STOCK CORP. LAW §55 provides:
The directors of every stock corporation shall be chosen at
the time and place fixed by the by-laws of the corporation
by a plurality of the votes at such election, provided that ....
the by-laws, may fix the number of shares, not exceeding a
majority, necessary to constitute a quorum.
11. See. eg., In re Baldwinsville Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 268 App. Div. 414,
51 N.Y.S.2d 816 (4th Dep't 1944).
12. Koral v. Savory, 276 N.Y. 215 (1936); United Copper Securities Co. v.
Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 375 S. Ct. 509 (1917).
13. Oakes v. Cattaraugus Water Co., 143 N.Y. 430, 38 N.E. 461 (1894); N.Y.
STOCK CORP. LAW §60.
14. In re Bernheimer, - Misc.-, 43 N.Y.S.2d 300 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Twyef-
fort v. Unexcelled Mfg. Co., 263 N.Y. 6, 188 N.E. 138 (1933).
15. 2 N.Y.2d 493, 161 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1957).
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mously held that a secretary-treasurer of a closely held corporation could sue
strangers to the corporation for conversion of corporate property. The issue arose
on a motion to vacate and set aside the service of summons.", Admitting that
ordinarily a secretary-treasurer has no implied power to encroach upon the
president's authority, the Court considered that the evidence in the instant case
indicated that the secretary-treasurer had been actually managing the business of
the corporation, and the president had withdrawn from active participation.
It followed therefore, reasoned the Court, that the secretary-treasurer had sufficient
authority to prevent the defendant strangers to the corporation from challenging
his power to protect the interests of the corporation.
In view of the factual setting of the case, the situation that the movant
was a stranger to the corporation, and because it has been previously held that
lesser corporate officers may, by virtue of exercising the management functions,
bind the corporation,11 it would not seem that the case represents an unreasonable
inroad upon the power of either the board of directors or the president to
commence litigation on behalf of the corporation.
Alienation Of Corporate Stock-Reasonableness Of Restraint
It has been generally held in this state that a reasonable restraint on the
alienation of corporate stock, giving the corporation a right of first option to
purchase, is valid.' 8 The problem, of course, is to determine what is a "reason-
able" restriction.
In Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp.,'0 the corporation reserved a 90 day option
to repurchase its stock, at the price originally paid for it, upon the death of any
shareholder. Plaintiff, executor of a deceased shareholder's estate, refused to
surrender the stock in question and demanded that the corporation be compelled
to deliver stock certificates to him. The Appellate Division20 reversed the trial
court and held the restrictive option invalid on the ground that it operated as a
prohibition on transfer of the stock. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding such
restriction is reasonable and valid.
It was pointed out that such options are usually treated as being contractual
in nature, and thus upheld if reasonable.2 ' The Court stated that reasonableness
16. - Misc.-, 142 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
19. See Barkin Const. Co. v. Goodman, 221 N.Y. 156, 116 N.E. 770 (1917);
Hastings v. Brooklyn Life. Ins. Co., 138 N.Y. 473, 34 N.E. 289 (1893).
18. See, eg., Penthouse Properties v. 1158 Fifth Ave., 256 App. Div. 685, 11
N.Y.S.2d 417 (1st Dep't 1938); Cowles v. Cowles Realty Co., 201 App. Div. 460, 194
N.Y. Supp. 546 (1st Dep't 1922).
19. 2 N.Y.2d 534, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1957).
20. 1 A.D.2d 599, 153 N.Y.S.2d 779 (2nd Dep't 1956).
21. Hassel v. Pohle, 214 App. Div. 654, 212 N.Y. Supp. 561 (2nd Dep't 1925).
